It seems to be a law in Hollywood that all good movies must be remade and milked for all the story's worth. Miracle on 34th Street (1947) is no exception; it spawned no less than three rip-offs--two TV movies (1959 and 1973) and a feature length film in 1994. We'll gloss over the TV movies (they're never much account anyway), but you may be familiar with the 1994 movie remake. We'll pull two good fruit cakes from this courtroom scene.
Mr. Collins (Prosecution): I object, your honor. This is irrelevant, immaterial, and absolutely ridiculous. Mr. Bedford is making a mockery of this court. He's not even established that there's such a person as Santa Claus.
Mr. Bedford (Defense): Your honor, I would ask Mr. Collins if he could offer any proof that there is no Santa Claus.
Mr. Bedford uses the fallacy argumentum ad ignoratiam or argument from ignorance: The defense's claim is true if the prosecution cannot disprove it.
To set up the second fruit cake, a little girl has just handed Judge Harper a dollar bill. After some reflection he states:
Upon inspection ... you will see the words, "In God We Trust." We're not here to prove that God exists, but we are here to prove that a being just as invisible and yet just as present exists. The Federal government puts its trust in God. It does so on faith and faith alone. ...
Now, if the government of the United States can issue its currency bearing a declaration of trust in God without demanding physical evidence of the existence or the nonexistence of a greater being, then the State of New York, by a similar demonstration of the collective faith of its people, can accept and acknowledge that Santa Claus does exist, and he exists in the person of Kris Kringle!
We find no less than two informal logical fallacies and a lexicological error in this Jerry-rigged judicial justification. First, Judge Harper commits a petitio principii (begging the question) by declaring a priori and without proof that Santa Claus is "a being just as invisible and yet just as present". The purpose of the inquest is to decide on Santa's existence, and yet the judge begins his argument by assuming certain traits of the being whose existence is in doubt. Second, he constructs a partial false analogy by comparing Santa Claus to God, stating that they are both "invisible" and "present"*. This he does not use as his principle proof but as a secondary support to the eventual ruling.
The last error is lexicological in origin. Judge Harper reasons that because the Federal Government posits its Faith in God without physical proof, then the State of New York can place its faith in Santa Claus without physical evidence as well (Nota Bene: the selective use of capitalization). Faith properly ascribed (and capitalized) is a belief in things not seen that are true. On the other hand, faith improperly ascribed (and not capitalized) is a belief in things not seen that are not true.
Regardless of your supporting arguments, only "faith" can be applied to belief in Santa Claus. Should you be of the opinion that the term "faith" should be both to belief in God as well as to belief in Santa Claus, that is your prerogative. However, we at AtS say faith in Santa Claus and Faith in God.
Merry Christmas!
* Had the Judge declared, "Because God is invisible, is present, and is real; and because Santa is invisible and present; then Santa is real," it would have been a complete false analogy. As is stands, the Judge left the analogy incomplete and used it not as his sole primary argument, but merely as a feel-good aside to give an air of security and wholeness to his logic.
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